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ABSTRACT 
This paper addresses the question of how to model government behavior. The 
central thought is· that in principle the same behavioral model should apply to the 
behavior of individuals in the private sector as well as the public sector. The paper 
starts, therefore, with an outline of the contours of a general model of individual 
behavior. Use is thereby made of the so-called interest function approach that I 
developed in On the !11teractio11 Between State and Private Sector (Amsterdam: 
North-Holland, 1983) and which is somewhat further elaborated in this paper. The 
model is subsequently applied to the behavior of the individuals that makeup the 
government organization, bureaucrats and politicians. The potential importance of 
the approach is indicated by a short survey of the theoretical and empirical results 
obtained with it so far. 
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ut ea, quae ad hanc scie11tiam spectant, eadem 
a11imi libertate, qua res mathematicas so/emus, 
i11quirerem, sedulo curavi, huma11as actiones 11on 
ridere, non lugere, 11eque detestari, sed intel/igere1 
Spinoza 
I. Public finance is one of the best starting points for the study of society and in 
particular, but not exclusively, of its political life: "The spirit of a people, its 
cultural level, its social structure, the deeds its policy may prepare--al/ this and 
more is written in its fiscal history, stripped of all phrases. He who knows how to 
listen to the message here discerns the thunder of world history more clearly than 
anywhere else." This claimed the great economist Joseph Schumpeter in 1918 in a 
study entitled "The Crisis of the Tax State" (originally in German).2 
Two things are immediately clear from this opening: first, that crises in 
government finance have occurred before, and, second, that public finance is 
actually the most interesting subject in economics to do research on, when it comes 
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to it. I will not blame the reader who is not totally convinced of the latter point, 
but I am pretty sure that he or she will at least subscribe to the view that to have a 
good understanding of these factors that in reality determine government behavior 
is not only necessary for a satisfactory analysis of the problems that governments 
have to face, but also for comprehending the way an economy functions and for the 
development of economic policies that are attractive. In this respect one need not 
go as far as the economic historian North who is of the opinion that "the key 
margin of decision-making in the society today is access to government influence.''3 
The mere observation that, even disregarding all regulation, in many market 
economies the share of government expenditure apprnximates or even exceeds 50 
percent of national income should suffice.4 
The question then arises to what extent research in public finance has 
contributed to the development of a good apprehension of government behavior, the 
importance of which I just mentioned. My answer to this question would be that, 
notwithstanding its many achievements, its contribution is still quite small. But the 
signs are good. Public finance as a research area has witnessed an enormous 
development after the Second World War. While initially attention was almost 
exclusively focused on the theory of taxation, 5 research has been extended into the 
direction of a full-fledged economic theory of the government, public or collective 
sector (these terms will be used interchangeably), on an equal footing with the 
economic theory of the private sector. To an important extent the theory of public 
goods , s timulated by the seminal work of Samuelson,6 has contributed to this
change of content. But, in addition, a strong impetus was given by the rise of 
macro-economic theory and the concomitant extension and deepening of the theory 
of economic policy into a quantitative direction, pioneered by Tinbergen, and also 
Theil.7 
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Because of that, attention gradually shifted from the traditional issue of 
taxation to the economic significance of government expenditure and the goods and 
services that go with it, causing the name public finance--although still widely used­
-to become more and more out of line with what it actually stands for. 
I talked of a development in this direction of a full-fledged economic theory of 
the public sector. To my opinion this goal has not yet been achieved. And I do 
not mean with this that the theory is not yet finished, for this it will probably 
never be. What I mean is that an essential element is missing, and that is a 
satisfactory behavioral theory. It is still characteristic for the theory to deal with 
the question how governments should behave in order to attain stated ends instead 
of asking how .they actually make their decisions, as determined by the behavior of 
the bureaucrats and politicians that make up these organizations. In that respect 
there has not been much of a change since the time that one of the greatest Dutch 
philosophers, Spinoza, lived. Around 1676 he wrote in a, alas uncompleted, treatise 
on the state that his colleagues did not take people as they are but as they wanted 
to see them, and that they, therefore, did not succeed in working out a useful 
theory of the State. 8 
But that is for now too negative. Especially during the last two decades or so 
there have been attempts from two different points of view-- the one fitting within 
the Marxist and the other within the neoclassical tradition in economic theory--to 
change the situation. 9 The second point of view--in the literature known as
"public choice"--has up to now turned out to be the more successful, leading to 
numerous theoretical and empirical studies on political decision-making, incited by 
the work of pioneers like Buchanan, Downs, Olson and Tullock. 1 O It cannot be 
denied that one has succeeded here in developing a number of interesting 
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hypotheses concerning the behavior of political agents such as voters, parties, 
bureaucrats, and politicians. 11 Nevertheless, at least in my view, one has not been
able to construct a general coherent theory, such that the behavior of the 
government organization can be satisfactorily studied - -even in their own 
neoclassical terms--as part of the general economic process. Perhaps this is also the 
main reason why these studies cover less than 4 percent of the space of such well­
known general textbooks on public finance as the ones by Boadway and Wildasin, 
and Musgrave and Musgrave. 12 
I will refrain here from going into the details of my argumentation. 13 Instead,
I prefer now to introduce to the reader an approach to the study of government 
behavior that I have been working on in cooperation with others. Although it is 
realized that "there are many approaches but few arrivals," 14 we think tha t this
approach may bring nearer the theoretical coherence that is looked for. I begin 
with some remarks on human behavior in general. 
2. Let me start with a fairly safe point of departure. I assume that individuals, 
for whatever reasons, take an interest in the possession of--or, to put it differently, 
have preferences with respect to--goods (including services) that can either be 
obtained through the market by paying a price or, otherwise, outside the market. 
Regarding the latter, attention will be restricted here to government provided goods. 
In order to obtain market goods an income is needed, which enables an individual 
to influence the flow of these goods, that is to exert an effective demand for them. 
Government provided goods, on the other hand, are obtained by influencing the 
political decision-making process. Through the use of political influence an 
effective demand for such goods is established. It should be noted, however, that 
due to the public (collective) character of some goods--think of defense--one need 
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not always have such influence at one's own disposal in order to be able to consume 
them. Now, before I go into the restrictions that individuals meet when trying to 
realize their interests, it seems appropriate to first take a closer view of these 
interests. 
3. Given the limited means that individuals have at their disposal, their interests
will generally conflict. The intensity of these conflicts will depend, however, on 
the extent to which they share each others interests. Let us consider then for what 
reasons this sharing may occur. 
In the first place, although subject to serious controversy, it cannot be excluded 
that care for the interests of other people is innate (a genetic endowment). I would 
like to call this "altruism" if the interests of the other are naturally supported, and 
"jealousy" if the reverse case holds, that is if one is naturally inclined to act against 
the interests of the other. 15 Employing, furthermore, the usual concept of a utility 
function to describe the relationship between the goods an individual has at its 
disposal and the welfare or utility it derives from them, altruism or jealousy implies 
that goods available to other people--as perceived by the individual- -are an 
argument in its utility function, irrespective of the situation (circumstances) in 
which the individual finds itself. This is, of course, not the right place to deal 
extensively with the well-known "nature-nurture" problem that is involved here. 
The only point I want to make is that biologically determined other-directedness 
cannot a priori be excluded, and should at least theoretically be allowed for. It is 
to be noted, furthermore, that the implied fact that it should show up irrespective 
the individual's situation gives, in principle, at least an opportunity to detect its 
presence empirically. At any rate, it is important in view of the implications to 
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distinguish it analytically from the other forms of (acquired) other-directedness that 
will be explicitly considered below. 
As a second reason why interests may be shared I mention mobility. I refer 
here to the possibility that individuals perceive a positive probability to arrive at 
the position of another individual. Such a probability may be not desired, 16 as in 
the case of involuntary unemployment, but may also have to do with the fact that 
an individual voluntarily orientates itself on a potential transition to another 
position in the future, which can be considered as a form of what sociologists call 
"anticipatory socialization."17 In case of a positive probability it can be expected
that individuals will pay heed to the interests of those a lready in the position 
concerned. 
If people are distinguished by certain social characteristics--as is common in 
social research--and their position is determined in that way, the possibility arises 
that individuals in a particular position share the interests of individuals in other 
positions due to the fact that they simultaneously share these other positions; in 
which case they are said to occupy multiple positions. For example ,  one can 
distinguish between unemployed and capital-owners, but there are also unemployed 
shareholders. The image of the "homo sociologicus" with its different social 
positions and concomitant social roles is applicable here. 18 This presents a third 
reason why interests can be shared. To give an example, our unemployed share­
holder will not only be interested in government policies regarding unemployment 
benefits, but also--and at the same time--in policies with respect to profit taxation. 
A property common to the reasons given so far is that individuals in a 
particular position "voluntarily"--that is, without being pressured to by other people 
(see below)--take account of, and support, the interests of individuals in other 
positions. For each position a utility function applies, which may be characterized 
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by altruism or jealousy. In case of mobility or multiple positions the welfare or 
utility of an individual can be thought to be determined by a weighted 
representation of  the utility functions associated with the relevant positions. It 
stands to reason that the weights of the thus composed--complex--utility function 
will  depend on the relative importance of the different positions. In case of 
mobility the probabilities related to these positions may serve to that purpose, while 
in case of multiple positions the relative contribution of the latter to the total 
control over goods by the individual present themselves as suitable candidates in 
that respect. Note, in comparison with altruism and jealousy as defined, that here 
the circumstances in which the individual finds itself--in terms of mobility and 
multiplicity of positions--are considered to determine whether the interests of other 
people are an argument in the farmer's (complex) utility function, which may 
consequently be expected to shape the individual's behavior. In principle at least, 
this aspect gives an opportunity to empirically sift out behavioral mo tives by 
studying behavior under different circumstances. 
4. In trying to realize its interests, and thereby its welfare or utility, the
individual encounters restrictions on the means that might be used to that end. 
These constraints may be related to attempts by others to influence the individual's 
behavior, but may also have an "impersonal" character, in the complementary sense 
of not being related to said attempts (behavior of people may play a role though; 
see below). In case of the former I will speak of pressure, and in case of the latter 
of structural coercion. For the sake of clarity, it is emphasized in this context that 
these concepts are not meant to evoke any non-neutral (i.e.,  pejorative) valuation. 
In view of our present subject--the enumeration of reasons why individuals care 
for other people's interests- -! will first pay attention to an important aspect of 
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pressure. I refer here to the well-known phenomenon in psychology and sociology 
that intensive influencing of behavior, accompanied by rewards and punishments 
(positive and negative sanctions) may eventually lead to the result that people show 
the desired behavior as if voluntarily. In this way behavioral norms--i.e. ,  opinions 
about how one should behave--are produced and instilled (internalized), 
institutionalization of behavior takes place, and culture is developed and preserved. 
A clear example is the education of children by parents and teachers. But there are 
many other examples. In fact we have to do here with a very common phenomenon 
to which everyone, to a greater or lesser extent, contributes, at home, at work, or in 
other social surroundings. The way markets and organizations function is co­
determined by them. Norms and institutions are capital goods subject to decay, the 
often fairly diffuse production process of which can be very labor intensive (as in 
case of  the education of children), but also very capital intensive (think of the 
structuring of the relationships between the great powers in which armaments play 
an important role). Because of the scarce means involved and the significance of 
institutions, economists should not be satisfied with taking them simply as data--in 
so far as they are at all allowed for in economic studies. The recent interest in the 
subject shown by authors like Schotter, Taylor and Williamson should be welcomed 
therefore. 19 
In the present context it is important to observe that due to continuous pressure 
accompanied by sanctions, individuals may behave as if they voluntarily serve the 
interests of other people. While making their decisions they simultaneously take 
account of their own interests as well as--one might say--the vested interests of 
those other people.  A fourth reason has been found herewith why individuals, 
albeit not voluntarily this time, pay heed to other people's interests. Also in this 
case, the welfare or utility of the individual subject to pressure can be thought to 
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be determined by a weighted representation of the utility functions involved, where 
the weights this time reflect the extent to which other people succeed in getting 
their interests vested with the individual. Unless there is sufficient reinforcement 
("investment") through the use of pressure, the weights will decay, as discussed 
above. Again in principle at  least, this aspect may give an opportunity to 
empirically distinguish this behavioral motive for other-directedness from others. 
5. A situation different from that in case of pressure is obtained with restrictions 
that are not due to influence attempts by other individuals, and in that sense have 
an impersonal character. Such restrictions were earlier subsumed under the heading 
of structural coercion. They can be of a technical kind--for example, for some 
people a day unfortunately only counts 24 hours--but may also originate with the 
behavior of other individuals and the expectations generated thereby. A nice 
example renders Becker's "rotten kid" theorem. This theorem learns that when a 
parent derives utility from the welfare of her or his children and transfers income 
to them because of that, even the most selfish child in the family may decide to act · 
in a way that increases family income and thereby the welfare of the parent. The 
reason is that the "rotten kid" realizes that such behavior furthers its own interests 
because of the income transfers by its parent.2° Contrary to what is the case with 
pressure, the interests of other people will now only be furthered if this benefits 
the individual's own--including vested--interests. They are not an argument in the 
complex utility function of the individual. The behavioral response is purely 
situation specific, which gives a clue for the empirical determination of this motive. 
For the same reason, members of social groups (such as the unemployed or the 
self-employed), whenever they put pressure on the government, will focus on the 
interests of a representative individual in the group. Not necessarily because they 
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share or serve this individual's interests due to mobility or pressure, but because of 
the fact that in politics purely individual matters typically (corruption excluded) do 
not count. From the supply side--bureaucrats and politicians--as well as from the 
demand side, social groups are generally referred to where government policies are 
concerned. It is not surprising then that empirical research shows that voters do not 
have their vote so much determined by personal circumstances as by developments 
on the level of the social groups they refer to, and for which they hold politicians 
or political parties responsible.21
6. It is time for a brief summary. I have mentioned a number of reasons why the 
utility or welfare of an individual will depend on that of other individuals, causing 
other-directed behavior. Voluntarily, that is without being pressured to, one may 
be interested in the fortune of other people, because of: (a) innate altruism or 
jealousy; (b) the fact that one occupies multiple (social) positions; and (c) mobility, 
which means there is a chance of getting into another position. Apart from this it 
is possible that other-directedness is forced upon an individual by the use of 
pressure, which may accumulate to vested interests or norms causing the individual-­
as if voluntarily- -to show the desired behavior. The individual will do this to a 
gradually lesser extent, if the decay to which vested interests and norms are subject 
is not sufficiently countered by new pressure. In the literature this is called "norm 
enforcement" or "norm sending."22 
On these grounds I came to the conclusion that the utility or welfare of an 
individual can be represented by a weighted average of the utility the individual 
supposes (representative) individuals to have in the social positions to which it 
refers--and which, therefore, determine its reference group--because of mobility, 
pressure, and its own specific or multiple positions. To each of the relevant 
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positions a utility function applies which may or may not be characterized by 
altruism or jealousy. The weights in the complex utility function thus obtained will 
thereby in case of multiple positions depend on the relative contribution of these 
positions to the individual's total control over goods, in case of mobility on the 
probabilities involved, and in case of pressure on the extent to which other people 
succeed in getting their interests vested with the individual .  The level of welfare 
attainable by the individual will further depend on the structural coercion--the 
"impersonal" behavioral restrictions--that it meets. Here also the interests of other 
individuals may play an important role, as was discussed above for voters and 
political interest groups. In case of structural coercion these interests only have an 
instrumental function, however, in the sense that the individual will only refer to 
those concerned--that is, take account of them--in as much as it will further its 
own (including vested) interests. While discussing the different behavioral motives 
I have, furthermore, cursorily indicated the way empirical information on their 
impact can, in principle, be obtained. 
7. Before I go into the significance of the foregoing for the study of government 
behavior, it seems useful first to indicate in more general terms some implications 
of the proposed point of view regarding human behavior. 
-- In the first place I hope to have made it clear that the usual assumption in 
economic theory that individuals only strive after their own, selfish interests is a 
rather shallow conception of human behavior, which can only be fruitful as a very 
first approach under certain circumstances. That is, if this assumption is thus 
interpreted that individuals do not care at all for the interests of other people. For, 
amongst the five reasons given above why people would care there are four--to wit: 
multiple positions, mobility, pressure and structural coercion--that are in harmony 
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with a less limited conception of selfish behavior. It is only in case of altruism or 
jealousy that one really gets into trouble with this assumption. Personally, I do not 
expect much, however, of the empirical relevance of these last two motives, even 
though it cannot be excluded by the sheer lack of data that they are an important 
reason for other-directed behavior.23 
Although the assumption of selfish behavior, when literally interpreted, does 
not preclude a sophisticated view of human activity, it should be noticed that this 
wider conception is only encountered to a limited extent and in some subfields of 
economic theory (including public choice). As an example, the attempts to develop 
a positive theory of redistribution can be mentioned, where, among others, use is 
made of the mobility argument presented above.24 Due to this motive people
would favor income redistribution, because they run a chance of finding themselves 
in a lower income class one day. 
-- This brings me to another interesting aspect of the wider conception of 
people's own interests. Although it may at face value seem to hold that the world 
would look much more equitable--in terms of equality of income--if everyone 
were an altruist, this need not always be the case. Reminding the reader of the fact 
that i n  case of altruism goods that are available to other individuals are an 
argument in the utility function of the altruistic individual, it will be clear that it  
depends on the specific character of this function to what extent, for example, the 
individual will be prepared to transfer income to those involved. It is not at all 
certain that income will be divided equally. On the other hand, it is a well-known 
result from the literature concerning insurance against risks that people who are 
risk-averse are prepared to pay a risk-premium ensuring that their income will be 
the same under all circumstances, irrespective the nature of their utility function or 
the amount of the premium.25 For those dependent on transfers the presence of
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mobility--that is, here, the presence of risk for the not yet dependent--may 
therefore lead to a higher income than would hold under altruism. 
-- A third implication that I would like to focus attention upon concerns the 
determination of the character of the utility function of an individual. It was 
noticed before that the utility or welfare level of an individual is, on the one hand, 
determined by the utility the individual associates with the social positions to which 
it refers, and, on the other hand, by the "impersonal" behavioral restrictions 
(structural coercion) that it encounters. By making the usual assumption of utility 
maximization, the behavior of the individual would, in principle, be determined. 
The assumption boils down to assuming that individuals will follow their preference 
direction, as indicated by their utility function, until they are confronted with the 
barriers thrown up by structural coercion. In this way it is derived in the theory of 
consumer behavior, for example, what an individual will buy, given income and 
prices. But this does not exhaust the possibilities of application. Again in 
principle, it is also possible namely to follow the reverse procedure. Given the 
factual behavior of individuals and sufficient information with respect to the 
structural coercion that they face--in our example this would be information on 
income and prices--some knowledge can be acquired regarding the utility function 
representing their preferences. Through its behavior the individual reveals the 
importance it attaches to the control over particular goods. In economics this 
procedure is known as the method of revealed preference. This method is not only 
interesting in itself, but, I am afraid, also indispensable for the earlier indicated 
way to make predictions. Unfortunately, both ways are treacherous.26 Even
disregarding the problem that corrections have to be made for the effects of 
structural coercion, there is the additional problem that the utility function 
mentioned is in fact--given the validity of my earlier exposition--composed of 
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different utility functions which hold for (representative) individuals in particular 
social positions; people to which the individual refers because of mobility, pressure, 
or multiple positions. Only one such function is associated with the specific 
position in which the individual is observed. If one wants to derive the character 
of this function from the individual's behavior, it will, consequently, be necessary 
to correct for the effect of the other relevant utility functions. For, if my thinking 
is sound, it is to be expected, for example, that an individual will attain a higher 
utility or welfare level if the subjective probability of arriving at a position with a 
(perceived) higher welfare level increases, even though nothing changes with respect 
to the specific position in which the individual finds itself at that time. Under the 
influence of a changing environment its preferences and behavior will change.27
-- There is one other point that I, finally, would like to go into in this context. 
It deals with the information that is necessary to explain and predict behavior. 
Although it is realized, of course, that in practice it can be extremely difficult--if 
not impossible--to disentangle all the various motives that are said to determine 
individual behavior, I have nevertheless ventured this excursion into an area that, as 
was earlier noted, is reminiscent of the longstanding, and touchy, "nature-nurtur!l" 
debate in .the social sciences, for mainly two reasons: first, because of the 
theoretical implications of the distinctions made which are in my view important 
for a better understanding of social phenomena, and thereby for the development of 
economic theory as a behavioral science, as I hope to have illustrated above; and, 
second, because of the fact that, even though the final answer on all our questions 
may never be obtained, this does not seem to preclude that at least some useful 
empirical light can be thrown on the said motives, the possibility of which I have 
already sketchily indicated while discussing them. 
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Let us once more take a look at the different factors involved. In general the 
most serious informational problems can be expected with the determination of the 
impact of altruism (or jealousy) and pressure. Information regarding multiple 
positions ·and mobility, even though perhaps not always available yet in a 
satisfactory way, can in principle. be obtained, albeit that the nasty problem that 
only perceptions count will have to be surmounted. With pressure--vested interests-
-it is becoming a lot more difficult. Nevertheless, even in that case theoretical, 
especially game-theoretical, instruments exist that can be fruitfully applied--as I 
have tried to show elsewhere28--provided that the source of pressure is identifiable 
and still active. For example, with respect to the vested interests accumulated by 
the pressure that parents and children, or a large company and a (local) 
government, exert on each other, a non-trivial analysis can be carried out, to my 
opinion. It is different with the more diffuse vested interests or behavioral norms 
that an individual has internalized under the pressure of its educators, which are 
not so much referring to particular persons as well as a "generalized other." The 
exact significance o f  them will be hard to determine. This is also the case, it 
seems, with altruism and jealousy. Have we thereby ended in a dead alley? I do 
not think so, even disregarding the factual importance of  the aforementioned 
factors. For, although norms are subject to decay, as earlier noticed, they--and 
particularly last-mentioned factors--are generally of such a persistent (structural) 
nature that they will have a more or less constant i nfluence over quite a long 
period. Changes in behavior can then be (largely) ascribed to changes in factors 
about which information can be obtained. Parenthetically, it is noted that 
' b ' 'l' h I h 29 laboratory expenments may prove to e an important aux1 iary researc too ere. 
This concludes my short digression on individual behavior. It will form the 
theoretical basis for the sequel of this article, which deals with government 
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behavior. The central thought is that the same factors underlie the behavior of 
individuals in the public sector as in the private sector. 
8 . "Man in the public sector" is,  apart from an intriguing title, an important
theme. After all, our attitude with respect to this sector in the economy depends 
on our view of the way people in this sector behave. Is  the supposition that 
governmental policies are always directed at the furtherance of the "commonweal" 
or "general interest," as our laws and also the usual (often implicit) assumption in 
economic theory suggest, or is one of the opinion, for example, tha t  the state 
suppresses and laws are just a lie? 
The students of law Algra and Janssen call the term general interest as such an 
empty box. 3o In· their view, the general interest should be the result of a weighing
process; different interests are balanced against each other and what presents itself 
as the primary interest may in that case be called the "general interest," they 
write.31 By using the word "should," they attach a normative interpretation to this.
Arrow has shown, however, that in general--without restricting the preference 
domain of individuals, for example,--no such interest can be derived in a non­
dictatorial way.32
But, also a positive interpretation can be given of this substantiation of the 
concept. What is at stake then is to determine in which way the government 
factually takes account of the interests of individuals. For the explanation of 
government behavior only this conception of the term general interest is of  concern. 
To arrive at the operationalization aimed at, I will use the thoughts on individual 
behavior developed above. The complex utility function of which I spoke, which is 
a weighted average of the utility functions of (representative) individuals in social 
positions to which the individual refers for reasons given before, this complex 
17 
utility function I would like to suggest as representing the general interest as it is 
effective for the i11dividual involved (i.e., influences its behavior). The effective 
general interest is, consequently, likely to differ per individual, 33 as is the extent to 
which the individual can, and will, further this interest. A dictator has presumably 
more means available to realize her or his general interest than a slave. In my 
view, also, the general interest need not per se be constant for an individual. A 
change in reference group, due to taking a job in the public sector or because of 
being elected as a politician, for example, will also change the effective general 
interest of an individual. How exactly, one may ask? And, further: How will all 
these general interests of politicians, and bureaucrats, determine the general interest 
as reflected by the factual behavior of the government? These are the central 
questions I would like to deal with below. However, I should immediately temper 
your rising expectations somewhat by stressing that I can only sketch here the 
outlines of an answer. Space considerations alone force me to leave many important­
-such as international--aspects aside. 
9 . As point of departure, I take my earlier remark that in the political process
interests on a purely individual level will generally have no impact for obvious 
reasons (think alone of the informational problems involved). Only the effective-­
politically influential--i11terests of represe11tative i11dividuals of social groups will 
play a role in the decision-making process of the government, in the form in which 
they are perceived by the decision-makers within that organization. Interests 
acquire effectiveness when they are "voluntarily" taken along in the decision­
making process by agents within the government organization, or under pressure or 
because of structural coercion, as was earlier argued for individuals in general. The 
interests of the aforementioned representative individuals may be represented by a 
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complex utility function which reflects the utility functions of the individuals 
making up these social groups. Since it is a fictitious individual that is focused at, 
I prefer here the term interest fu11ctio11 instead of utility function. 
I agree, this sounds fairly complex. Nevertheless, the political landscape 
becomes, at  least on first appearance, a lot more accessible now that we can 
concentrate on social groups instead of individuals. But it will be clear that even 
on this level of abstraction the analysis of government behavior will still be 
difficult because of the great variety of social groups that one can think of. I need 
only mention the many interest groups that are referred to in the media. In almost 
any governmental policy area they are encountered. We will have to lower our 
ambitions, therefore. This is possible by first redirecting our attention from the 
multiplicity of government policies to the total value of goods provided by the 
government outside the market and the taxes levied to that purpose. The interests 
of individuals can then be reduced--as a first approach--to an interest in disposable 
(after-tax) income for the purchase of market goods and a, as yet undifferentiated, 
interest in ( non-marketed) government provided goods. The way income is 
acquired is subsequently the focal point for an explicit distinction between a 
number of economic positions upon which attention can further be focused at first 
instance. The institutional structure of the production process in a market economy 
is such that in that perspective four eleme11tary positio11s or social classes can be 
distinguished: (I) government sector workers (bureaucrats and politicians), with an 
income out of taxes made possible by the government's monopoly of legitimate 
physical force;34 (2) private sector workers, with a wage income; (3) capital owners, 
with an income out of profits in a wide sense; and (4) "dependents," with an income 
out of transfers, originating with the aforementioned incomes. This partitioning is 
not only of significance for gross (before-tax) income, but also for the level of 
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disposable income a nd the available amount of government provided goods. I 
mention in this context the unequal opportunities and means for individuals in the 
indicated positions to influence the supply of goods and the accompanying price-tag 
(taxes). While workers and capital owners can bring their command over the supply 
of, respectively, labor and capital into play, the "dependents" clearly occupy the 
weakest position here. One could further point at important differences between 
workers in the private sector and workers in the public sector, but I will refrain 
from this because of space limitations. 35 Illustrative of the fact that the
distinctions are not only theoretically interesting are the, in the Dutch media (but 
also elsewhere), already for quite some time much belabored upon tensions among 
precisely these four social groups. This is also shown by the government's program 
and the disputes surrounding it. An important place is taken by its policy 
regarding public sector workers and that concerning transfer recipients, while the 
position and incomes of private sector workers and capital owners are central to its 
policy directed at the recovery of the market. I would, finally, like to refer to a, 
recently publicized, very important study by the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics 
on the development of purchasing power in the Netherlands, in which the 
significance of the aforementioned social groups--and the mobility between them-­
is emphasized. 36 The interest functions for these groups will, in their most 
elementary form, only have as arguments the level of disposable income and the 
consumption level of government provided goods for the representative individual. 
However, since it could be concluded that, for a number of reasons, individuals 
care for (pay heed to) the interests of other people, these functions will in reality 
have a more complex character, as earlier indicated. 
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10. Among the complex interest functions for the social groups referred to, the one 
for government sector workers is of particular importance as it underlies government 
policy and reflects the general interest that is in reality effective for the 
government. Government policy is for simplicity restricted here to the 
determination and provision of the total amount of government provided goods, and 
the distribution of the costs over the four groups distinguished. I hope it will be 
clear to the reader, by this time, that following my approach said function is a 
weighted representation of the interest functions perceived by government sector 
workers for the positions to which they refer (here maximally four), including their 
own position. 
Assuming that the latter will try to realize their interests--among which the 
vested interests due to pressure--as best they can, government behavior can now be 
determined if further is known what "impersonal" restrictions (structural coercion) 
the government is facing. Particularly important here is the question which 
economic model can be considered as representative for the way decision-makers 
take account of the nature of the economic process and of the impact of 
government behavior on this process. 
This concludes, in fact, the rough sketch I wanted to present of my approach 
of government behavior, which I have labeled the interest fu11ctio11 approach, for 
convenience. 37 Before offering an impression of what can be done with this 
approach, I will first go somewhat deeper into some aspects concerning the complex 
interest function for the government. 
11. In the first place, it is perhaps desirable to indicate once more the nature of 
this function. According to my reasoning it represents the general interest as it is 
effective with the decision-makers within the government organization. In 
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principle, an operational definition is  obtained herewith of a concept that was said 
to be meaningless if merely employed as such. This operationalization concerns the 
factual behavior of the government. It goes without saying, however, that it is free 
to anyone to define a function that gives a normative content to the concept, 
indicating to what extent the government should further interests on moral grounds. 
One speaks of a "social welfare function" in that case, which is usually conceived of 
as a fair compromise between the underlying utility function of all individuals.38
As was noticed before, it is common in the literature to approach government 
behavior in this, normative, way. In the theoretical debate pertaining to the nature 
of such a welfare function, Harsanyi has argued that social welfare is represented 
by the unweighted average of the utility functions of all individuals. 39 To support
his assertion, he, inter alia, argues that every rational individual would endorse such 
a specification if it were absolutely uncertain with respect to its position in society 
(or imagines same by way of thought experiment) and, consequently, attaches, for 
all social positions, the same subjective probability to the possibility of arriving at a 
particular position. For, in that case only the individual could rightfully be called 
impartial, which is required for a moral judgement. 
Since mobility is one of the determinants of the complex interest function for 
the government, it cannot be excluded, theoretically at least, that this function is of 
the same nature as the aforementioned social welfare function. For practical 
purposes, it  is of greater significance, though, that if empirical content can be 
given to the interest function for the government (see below), this function can be 
compared with a social welfare function such as derived by Harsanyi, for example. 
In this way information can be obtained on the extent and the nature of the 
partiality of government policy.40
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But there is more. As a behavioral model underlies the interest function, new 
instruments are suggested by which the effectiveness of advices aiming at policy 
changes can be improved. Perhaps it can then be avoided more often that policy 
proposals cross the government organization like uncontrolled missiles, as a high 
government official in the Netherlands once remarked.41 It can be questioned, for 
example, whether to direct one's policy advices to the government itself is under all 
circumstances the most sensible thing to do. Perhaps the reader allows me--on the 
risk of becoming a bore-- to remind her or him of the possible reasons why 
individuals, and, thus, also government sector workers, will pay attention to the 
interests of others. These were: innate altruism or jealousy, multiple positions, 
mobility, pressure and structural coercion. Suppose now that government sector 
workers are such selfish people that they will only take account of the interests of 
other social groups if they are exposed to continuous pressure, accumulating to 
vested interests, or for merely instrumental reasons (structural coercion). In that 
case, it does not make much sense, of course, to a policy advisor who, for whatever 
reasons, would like to see the interests of transfer recipients better promoted by the 
government, to direct her or his advices to this government. They will  not have 
any effect. The aspired goal might be achieved, however, by supplying new
information to the transfer recipients themselves, or to those sharing or serving 
their· interests, on the way(s) in which the pressure in favor of the transfer 
recipients could be enhanced in order to get their interests better vested with the 
government (given the existing state of altruism and jealousy, mobility, multiple 
positions and structural coercion). As it is likely that in reality only a few egoists 
of the indicated type can be found in the government organization, including the 
government among the advised will be a sensible thing to do. Disregarding innate 
altruism--a motive of which I said I personally do not expect that much- -most 
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people will serve the interests of transfer recipients to a greater or lesser extent 
under the influence of internalized general norms concerning the care for other 
people, but in particular also, I think, because of the probability to find oneself in 
a dependent's position (mobility), or because of the fact that one already receives 
transfers (multiple positions). The example given here refers to the group of the 
"dependents," but could obviously also have involved the capital owners or the 
private sector workers, that were distinguished as important social groups in the 
private sector. 
12. The second aspect connected with the complex interest function that I would
like to go into somewhat further, is the empirical significance of multiple positions 
and mobility. Apart from innate altruism, multiple positions and mobility are the 
only reasons why government sector workers "voluntarily" serve the interests of 
social groups in the private sector. In their absence, the latter have to fall back on 
the--costly--instrument of pressure to get their interests vested. In this context we 
should not only think of the actions of interest groups in the more traditional sense, 
but also of the interest promotion through political parties and elections. It is an 
interesting question,  therefore, to what extent mobility and multiple positions 
actually occur among government sector workers. 
There are only a very few studies in this area at hand for the Netherlands, the 
country to which I will restrict my attention. From a ranking published by 
Corpeleijn in 1980 of mobility figures for 44 industry groups (concerning the 
percentage of employees that had voluntarily chosen another employer in 1977 in 
comparison with 1976) it appears that "public administration, defense and social 
insurance" took a low 39th place (with a percentage of 2.8), while "education" 
ranked 30th (4.1), and "public utilities" 43rd (0.7); the average percentage was 5.6.42
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Moreover, averaged over all industry groups mobility occurred in 40 percent of the 
cases within the same industry group. As an indicator of job security, Corpeleijn 
used the percentage of layoffs. For the aforementioned industry group these 
percentages were, respectively, 1.3, 1.8,  and 0.9, while the average over all groups 
amounted to 3.3 percent. 
As regards the mobility of politicians, there is a study by Van Schendelen and 
Van der Paardt concerning the occupational mobility of members of the Second 
Chamber during the period 1970- 1974.43 In this period 122 members, out of a 
total of 150, left the Parliament, what amounts to 25 per year, a number that 
appears to correspond with the average on a yearly basis for the Sixties. It further 
shows up, that after elections approximately one- third of the old members do not 
come back. From the 122 members that left the Chamber, 53 percent choose an 
occupation in the government sector (including education),  18 percent retired, 12 
percent went to a political party or a social organization, 13 percent choose a 
business occupation (including self-employment). Less than 30 percent (and little 
more when excluding the retired), consequently, oriented itself on an occupation in 
the private sector, the sector which absorbs circa 80 percent of the total labor force. 
The percentage that opts for an occupation in the public sector approximately 
appears to equal the percentage that comes from this sector at the start of  their job 
in Parliament.44 An important role in this respect is undoubtedly played by the 
fact that in the Netherlands (due to a law called the "Non-activiteitswet" from 
1923), but also in other countries, politicians coming from the government sector 
enjoy some special facilities, such as the right to come back, as wel l  as special 
allowances to bridge any difference between their earnings as a bureaucrat and as a 
member of Parliament.45 Financial obstacles are scarcely present, therefore, for 
this category of politicians, while the political risk of resignation is almost 
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completely covered. According to Elzinga circa half of the members of the Second 
Chamber would have profited from this in the years 1976, 1980 and 1984.46 
Also with respect to the occurrence of multiple positions among government 
sector workers only very limited information is available. There is a study by 
Helmers et al. on "double functions" linking firms and government agencies, which 
aroused a lot of publicity at the time.47 Attention is in that study restricted,
however, to the "directeuren" and "commissarissen" (chief executive officers and 
directors) of 86 large firms, among which public firms and participations, while, 
for example, no distinction is made between directorships of bureaucrats for which 
they personally receive a remuneration, and those which they hold on behalf of the 
government. The research results suggest that such positions do not occur among 
top-level bureaucrats, but on the level of the (semi-) governmental institutions that 
are involved in counseling or in the execution of government policies; institutions 
that are sometimes denoted as the "fifth power." Their role is apparent in 
institutions like the "Sociaal Economische Raad" (Social Economic Council) and in 
those in the social insurance area, where the representation of the business sector 
(employers and employees) is legally regulated. It also comes out that not all 
governmental agencies are that favorite. Especially "Economic Affairs," "Finance" 
(through the governmental financial institutions), and "Education and Science" 
appear to be attractive departments. 
As concerns the Second Chamber, research by Van den Berg shows that, while 
until the latter half of the Fifties 70-80 percent of its members continued their 
occupation, in 1979 88 percent said to have given it up, when asked in a survey.48
Also with respect to paid side-functions the impression is that their number has 
considerably decreased, partly due to the improved earnings of the members. 
Elzinga mentions a number of 53 for the year 1982.49 
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Summarizing, I come to the tentative conclusion that mobility among 
government sector workers in the Netherlands is in general relatively low, 5o while 
the not so surprisingly greater mobility among members of Parliament is 
characterized by a strongly dominating orientation on the government sector and a 
very weak orientation on occupations in the private sector. Multiple positions seem 
to play a much more important role in so far as the direct furtherance of the 
private sector's interests are concerned, but this role does not seem to extend to the 
top-level of the bureaucracy, and seems further to be strongly fluctuating in 
number for the different subsectors of the government as well as for the different 
social groups. In particular the absence of the "dependents" (transfer recipients) 
catches the eye. To give an idea of the size of this group, I notice that in 1980 
those outside the labor force with a transfer income made up 39 percent of al l  
income recipients. 51
13. The reference to subsectors of the government brings me to the third, and
final,  aspect of the complex interest function for the government that I shortly 
want to highlight. Up until now I have addressed the group of government sector 
workers--who together make up the government--on a macro-level. The 
government is an organization, however, within which, by more detailed micro­
observation, again different positions can be distinguished. In that respect the 
government is not different from any organization in the private sector. The single 
essential difference is that the government successfully claims the monopoly of 
legitimate physical force within a certain geographical area. The military and the 
police enable it to force its policy upon dissidents or to coerce people to behave in 
a particular way, albeit that even here restrictions occur. For, was it not Talleyrand 
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who once noticed that you can do anything with bayonets except for sitting on 
them?52
As in other organizations the behavior of the government is determined by the 
interactions between the individuals that make up the organization. Because of the 
aforementioned monopoly that the government has at its disposal and the action 
space that it  creates, a more detailed knowledge of this organization is much 
desired. Notwithstanding the huge literature on organizations, it is probably fair to 
say that the theoretical modeling of the way organizations internally function is still 
in its infancy. Organizations, like firms or the government, are in economic theory 
typically treated as a black box, as I have in fact done so far.53 It is not my
intention to develop such a theory here. I only want to draw some lines along 
which it might be developed. Since we have again to do with the behavior of 
individuals in different positions, the same behavioral determinants should be 
expected to play a role as were distinguished when I discussed individual behavior 
in general. Also this time account should be taken of the impact of multiple 
positions, mobility, pressure, and structural coercion. Multiple positions seem to 
play a less important role here. Moreover, it is worth noticing that mobility will 
almost exclusively be upward, so that in this respect only the interests of superiors 
will be referred to. 
According to the traditional Weberian vision on the governmental organization 
as a bureaucracy, the arrow should be pointing in exactly the opposite direction for 
pressure. Superiors in the organization are supposed to put pressure on 
subordinates, but not the other way around. Dependent on the significance of the 
position for the extent to which others in the organization are able to realize their 
interests, the exerted pressure will crystallize into a vested interest with these 
others. The factual, informal organization, may therefore look considerably 
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different from the formal organization as described by the official blueprint. Even 
the boundaries of the organization become obscure by it. To give an example, if an 
organization--a firm, for instance--belongs to the private sector according to some 
formal criterion, it may nevertheless factually be subsumed under the government 
sector if its behavior is largely determined by the government, under the pressure 
of the latter. It is unimportant thereby whether the dependence is the result of 
financial support or is established otherwise, such as by regulation. Any definition 
of the government or public sector will therefore be rather arbitrary in practice. 54
I return to the different positions that can be distinguished within the 
government organization. In line with the approach that I introduced above, 
interest functions can again be formulated, albeit now for representative individuals 
in the positions just referred to. However, since these are positions within the 
group of government sector workers, the interests that play a role here are of a 
more particularized nature. In case of some particular department, for example, 
only the disposable income level and the availability of government provided goods 
for bureaucrats within that department will figure as arguments in this function in 
its most elementary form. To sketch my approach of the internal functioning of 
the government organization I restrict myself, for simplicity, to the following two 
hierarchical levels: the top level of Cabinet and Parliament, made up by the 
politicians, and the executive (departmental) level of the bureaucrats. On the top 
level the official (formal) decision-making takes place regarding, on the one hand, 
the distribution of national income over private and public sector, and, on the other 
hand, the al location of the means obtained by the latter over the different 
departments. If we now consider the position of a politician on this level, and 
neglect, for simplicity, the possible influence of altruism (or jealousy), multiple 
positions, and mobility, then the complex interest function for a "representative 
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politician" will be determined by: (a) the particularized interests of the politicians 
as government sector workers; (b) the interests of the different social groups (among 
which, again, the government sector workers) in so far as these have been vested 
with the politicians through the pressure of voters, political parties, and (other) 
pressure groups; and, finally, (c) the particularized interests of the bureaucrats of 
the different departments, again in so far as these have been able to vest their 
interests with the politicians by using pressure. What the representative politician 
looks like--and, thus, the complex interest function underlying the government 
budget and its distribution over the departments--is determined by a bargaining 
process among the politicians. Using game-theoretical arguments, this process can 
again be described in such a way that the said function can be represented as a 
weighted average of the different interests involved. Elsewhere, I have shown in 
greater detail how these things can be formalized along the indicated lines. 55
1 4. I shall now first resume the most important characteristics of the interest 
function approach of government behavior, and then shortly go into some . 
applications. 
Central to the approach is the attempt to contribute to the development of a 
theory of factual government behavior. 
A second characteristic is, that it is explicitly attempted to base such a theory 
on a general theory of individual behavior. Of assumptions with respect to the 
interests or preferences of individuals it is demanded--irrespective of whether these 
individuals are in the public sector or in the private sector--that they are consistent 
with plausible assumptions regarding the motivations of individuals. Thus, it is not 
a priori taken for granted that the motives of people in the one sector are different 
from those in the other. 56 
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A third characteristic is, that it is tried to take explicitly account of 
institutional aspects. For research strategic reasons, the structure of the production 
process in a market economy is thereby taken as point of departure for a distinction 
between four elementary positions, to wit: government sector worker, private sector 
worker, capital owner, and "dependent." These positions not only determine how 
interests manifest themselves, but are also important for the way in which these 
interest can be furthered. Whenever the available research tools permit such, more 
refined group divisions may of course be desired when studying particular 
problems. Differences in education or race, but also between geographical regions 
or industries may require so. 
The last characteristic of the approach that I want to mention here is a 
preference for formalization, in the sense of mathematical modeling. The reason is 
the complexity of the research area, where the thrust of an argument quite often 
depends on the exact specification of the assumed relationships be tween the 
variables used, as well as the desire to clear the way for experimental and empirical 
research. In this way more opportunities become available to judge the plausibility 
of theories. For the social sciences research industry this is of great importance if 
we do not want to get stuck in a "talk-science."57 I hurry to add that the use of
mathematics is as such no guarantee for its avoidance; after all mathematics also is a 
language. Applications are important, therefore. 
1 5. Using the approach sketched above, a number of theoretical and empirical 
studies have been carried out.58 As regards the theoretical research, the emphasis
so far has been on the study of the question of how the government would behave 
acc�rding to this approach and what the consequences subsequently would be for 
the development of the overall economic process, of which government behavior 
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only forms a part. The existing general (macro-) economic models are not fit for 
the latter, as the government is essentially taken outside the economic process (i.e., 
treated as exogenous), causing them to be misspecified for doing that job; to put it 
strongly, they give no insight into the factual development of the total economy.59 
Among other things, the influence of politics on the rise and development of 
short term as well as long term economic fluctuations has been studied, The extent 
to which the different social groups get their interests promoted by the government­
-or, put differently, the nature of the complex interest function of the government-­
appears to have an independent effect. By using a model of voting behavior this 
effect could be determined for an economy within a democratic political setting, 
marked by regular elections, as well as for an economy without elections.60
Since the weights people attach to their disposable income and the availability 
of government provided goods, as well as the political influence structure in an 
economy--also within the government organization--normally, only gradually 
change, it is not surprising that it is found, in line with everyday experience, that 
governmental policy changes are mostly of an incremental, or decremental, nature. 
Only shocks, such as due to a war or--under certain circumstances--because of 
changes in government, can violate this pattern.61
If it may be assumed that in actual decision-making within the government 
organization only rather simple notions (models) of the economic process are 
employed, where attention is particularly focused on more or less direct, "first­
order ,"  effects--and in view of the pluriformity of the visions offered by 
economists alone, this need not surprise us--our research results further show, for 
example ,  that the empirically often observed pro-cyclical behavior of the 
government can be given a behavior-theoretic explanation.62 
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Such results fly in the face of the image of the government that citizens are 
presented in numerous publications by politicians that try to legitimate their 
policies, but also by economists. Even though almost everyone seems to speak now­
adays of the uncontrollability of public expenditure and the restricted grip of the 
government on the economic process, this does not do away with the fact that 
across the whole party-political spectrum it is strongly suggested that, neglecting 
technical management problems and a possibly wrong choice of politicians, the 
government is there to effectuate an efficient allocation, a just income distribution, 
and a stabilization of the economy on a full-employment level. The probably most 
widely used introductory textbook on pu blic finance, that of Musgrave and 
Musgrave, speaks in this context of the three goals or functions of fiscal policy.63
It wil l  be clear from the foregoing that in my view such goals should not be 
assumed, but derived from a behavioral model concerning the actual functioning of 
the government.64 
I shall give another example in this context. Since the start of the Sixties the 
Netherlands have witnessed a so-called structural budget policy. Roughly put, the 
policy demands that the budget deficit of the government develops in such a way 
that on a structural basis an equilibrium between means and expenditure is 
maintained in the economy at a full-capacity levet.65 
Officially this structural norm for fiscal policy has been applied from 1 9 6 1  
until 1 979.  Under the pressure o f  the bad financial position o f  the government 
attention then shifted to the factual deficit. 
But, according to Koopmans and Wellink the dismantling of the policy already 
started at the beginning of the Seventies.66 The question can be raised, however,
whether this type of policy, that in essence requires that the government adjusts 
itself to the development in the private sector, has really been applied at all. In a 
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recent study that I carried out with Van Velthoven it is shown that also in a non­
normative way, that is by using the interest function approach of government 
behavior, the budget deficits that were obtained in these years can be explained, 
using rather plausible assumptions.67 
In view also of the historical analysis by Stevers of budget norms in the 
Netherlands, I am willing to defend the thesis that the structural budget norm has 
actually been used more as an instrument of rationalization than as a behavioral 
goal.68 
Another application of the interest function approach concerns the explanation 
of the development of the tax rate. The results obtained here by the same model 
for the Netherlands as well as the United States are encouraging.69 In this model,
pressure (political influence) and mobility (namely, the probability to become 
unemployed) play an explicit role. The results, at the very least, do not seem to 
contradict the significance imputed to these factors nor the finding, that is also 
obtained by other researchers, that the political color of the government does not 
produce the expected effect. 7o They suggest, furthermore, given the validity of the 
model, that the extent to which government sector workers, private sector workers, 
and capital owners (in these studies, because of data limitations, represented by the 
self-employed) succeed in influencing the political decision-making process can be 
approximated by the relative numerical strength of these social groups. The tax 
rate increases, for example, if the relative number of the self-employed in the labor 
force decreases. The same happens if the probability of unemployment rises. 
"Dependents" (that is, those dependent on transfer income) are thereby--with an eye 
on reality- - assumed to have no direct political influence. 7 1  Some su ggestive
empirical results pertaining to this assumption has, in the meantime, been presented 
in a study that focuses on social security.72
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The research that has been undertaken so far- -the explorative character of 
which demands that one should be careful when using its results--suggests that the 
following factors have played an important part in the growth of the public sector: 
the development of the numerical strength of the social groups that are actively 
involved in the production process, the probability of becoming a member of the 
group of "dependents," and economic growth. 
Although these are all first, tentative results, they nevertheless show that the 
proposed approach does not only lead to interesting theoretical implications, but 
that it  can also be used for the empirical study of government behavior and its 
impact on the economy. 
In developing the approach I hope to have sufficiently headed the advice given 
by Schumpeter in the study that I referred to in the beginning, which reads: "One 
should really never say 'the stale does this or that. ' It is always important lo 
recognize who or whose interest it is that sets the machine of the stale in motion and 
speaks through it."73 This evokes the question of who that man in the public sector 
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